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This paper describes an equilibrium matching model with two types of work-
ers producing two diﬀerent intermediate goods. Labour markets are perfectly
segmented, but productive complementarities between sectors and productive
substitutability within sectors arise. This deeply changes the eﬀects of labour
market policies. A welfare analysis is also conducted. Under constant returns to
scale in the matching technology, the so-called Hosios condition is suﬃcient to
guarantee the eﬃciency of the decentralized equilibrium.
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11 Introduction
The equilibrium matching model has become the standard framework of analysis for
aggregate labour markets. In a standard Pissarides (2000) framework, the matching
process between one ﬁrm and one worker is not instantaneous, because of some generic
frictions present in the labour market. The good market, on the contrary, is perfectly
competitive and ﬁrms face a completely elastic demand, so that an increase in supply
does not aﬀect the optimal price (see for instance Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999).
Starting with the work of Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996), search frictions have
been also introduced in pure RBC models. In these papers, the assumption of perfect
elasticity of the demand for goods is abandoned and a two-tier productive scheme is
usually considered. Workers are employed in intermediate goods sectors. Such goods,
together with capital, are sold to a ﬁnal representative ﬁrm that produces the unique
consumption good. However, these models are usually solved only numerically and
scant attention has been paid about their analytical properties.
In this paper I consider a simpliﬁed framework where there are only two intermedi-
ate sectors and individual have no access to capital markets. I show that an equilibrium
exists and is unique under mild assumptions on preferences and technology. Then, I
perform some comparative statics and I compare the results with those obtained in
a standard matching framework. When the demand for goods is no longer perfectly
elastic, new complementarities and substitutabilities arise in addition to that generated
by the matching technology. Every additional vacancy created in one sector decreases
ﬁrms’ revenues in that sector and enhances ﬁrms’ revenues of the other one. These
eﬀects come trough the price of the intermediate goods. Since a standard matching
framework does not take these eﬀects into account, I show it overestimates the impact
of a shock or policy intervention in the sector where such shock has occurred and, at
the same time, it ignores the eﬀects that emerge on other sectors of the economy.
This setup is similar to that developed by Acemoglu (2001) and Cahuc and Zylber-
berg (2004, pages 618-622). The diﬀerence with respect to Acemoglu’s paper is that
he proves the existence of (at least) one equilibrium only for a CES ﬁnal good produc-
tion function while I consider any constant returns to scale technology. In Cahuc and
Zylberberg’s textbook, on the other hand, only policy implications of their model are
shown but without explaining the mechanism that is at work in such set-up. Moreover,
existence and uniqueness is not proved.
22 The Model
2.1 Production Technology
Assume an economy with one ﬁnal good (the numeraire), two intermediate goods
sectors and two types m and n of inﬁnitely-lived and risk-neutral workers. This analysis
can be carried out even with more intermediate sectors. Here, I consider only two
for simplicity. The goods markets are perfectly competitive. Each producer of an
intermediate good hires only one type of worker. Moreover, every m-skilled employee
produces one unit of the intermediate good m and every n-skilled employee produces
one unit of the intermediate good n. Let Em (respectively, En) denote both the amount
of the m intermediate good (respectively, the n intermediate good) used to produce
the ﬁnal good and the number of workers employed in the m-th (resp. n-th) sector.
The ﬁnal good production function is homogeneous of degree one and written as:






2 < 0,i ∈ {m,n}. (1)
Furthermore, the two inputs are p-substitutes (0 < ∂2F
∂Em∂En < +∞)1. Let pi
denote the real price of the intermediate good i. Cost minimization leads to pi =
∂F(Em,En)/∂Ei, with i ∈ {m,n}. The price of each intermediate good depends nega-
tively on the number of workers employed in that sector and positively on the number
of workers employed in the other sector.
2.2 Search Technology
The model is markovian and developed in steady state. Time is continuous. Each
type of worker can be either unemployed and receive an unemployment beneﬁt bi or
be employed in his sector. The labour market is perfectly segmented. That is, every
m-type worker can be hired only by ﬁrms in the m sector and the same holds for n-type
workers. Due to various imperfections, the matching process is not instantaneous. The
matching function is by assumption identical in both intermediate sectors and it is
written respectively Mi = m(Ui,Vi), with Ui being the number of unemployed people
and Vi the number of job vacancies in sector i. The function m(.,.) is assumed to
be increasing, concave and homogeneous of degree 1. Search intensity is exogenous
and normalized to 1. Due to the constant return to scale in the matching process,
the model can be developed in terms of tightness indicator, namely θi ≡
Vi
Ui. The
rate at which vacant jobs become ﬁlled is q(θi) = Mi/Vi = m( 1
θi,1),q′(θi) < 0. Every
1I also assume Inada conditions: lim
En→0
∂F




3unemployed worker moves into employment according to a Poisson process with rate
α(θi) ≡ Mi/Vi = θiq(θi), with α′(θi) > 02. The elasticity of the probability qi of ﬁlling





In steady state, the stocks of individuals in each position are constant. With an





,i ∈ {m,n}. (2)
2.3 Preferences and job creation
Individuals are risk-neutral and have no access to capital market. Let r be the dis-
count rate common to all agents. In steady state, the expected lifetime income for an
unemployed worker is:
rVU,i = bi + α(θi)(VE,i − VU,i). (3)
This type of equation is standard in search literature. Being unemployed is similar to
holding an asset that pays a dividend of bi, the unemployment beneﬁt, and it has a
probability α(θi) of being transformed in employment. In this case, the worker obtains
VE,i, the asset value of being employed, and he loses VU,i. Similarly, the steady state
discounted present value of employment can be written as:
rVE,i = wi + φi(VU,i − VE,i), (4)
where wi is the wage bargained in the i-th intermediate sector.
On the other side of the market, let ΠE,i denote the ﬁrm’s discounted expected
return from an occupied job if the ﬁrm produces the ith intermediate good, namely it
hires workers endowed with skill i. For simplicity, taxation is not considered here and
therefore there is no Government budget condition. The discounted expected return of
vacant job is ΠV,i. I denote ki the cost of posting a vacancy and of selecting applicants.
For i ∈ {m,n}, the discounted expected returns satisfy the following conditions:
rΠE,i = pi − wi + φi (ΠV,i − ΠE,i), (5)
rΠV,i = −ki + q(θi)(ΠE,i − ΠV,i). (6)
In equilibrium, ﬁrms open vacancies as long as they yield a positive expected return.
Therefore, the equilibrium condition ΠV,i = 0, combined with (5) and (6), yields the
following vacancy-supply curve for each j:




2Moreover, limθi→0 q(θi) = +∞ and limθi→0 α(θi) = +∞.
4We can easily see that the vacancy-supply curve represents a decreasing relationship
between the net wage and labor market tightness, θi. Note also that (7) depends on
tightness indicators of both sectors, θi and θj, through the price of the intermediate
good pi. So, with a zero-proﬁt condition holding, an increase in θi implies a lower wage
wi for two reasons. First, because higher labor market tightness raises the expected cost
of ﬁlling a vacancy, ki/q(θi). Second, because higher labor market tightness in sector
i enhances employment through the steady state equation (2). More people employed
in one intermediate sector lowers the marginal productivity of that intermediate good.
So i-ﬁrms’ revenues are reduced (pi goes down). Moreover, an increase in labor market
tightness in the other sector, θj, raises the marginal productivity of the intermediate
good i, via Equation (2) and the condition we imposed in (1) about the cross derivative.
2.4 Wage formation
I assume that wages are bargained in both sectors of the economy according to the
axiomatic Nash solution. If β denotes the bargaining power of the worker (0 < β < 1),
the solution to the game can be written as VE,i − VU,i = γ(VE,i − VU,i + ΠE,i). This
property, the Bellman equations (4) and (3) and the free-entry condition (ΠE,i =
ki/q(θi) lead then to the following “wage-setting curve”:
wi = WSi ≡ βi(pi + θiki) + (1 − βi)bi. (8)
For each skill, the wage-setting curve wi = WSi cannot be shown to be always
upward sloping in (θi, wi) space. The reason is that, as θi increases, kiθi obviously
rises, but pi decreases. Nevertheless, I can equate the RHS of the vacancy-supply
curve (7) and the RHS of the wage-setting curve curve (8) and consider an implicit
equation for θi , namely Gi = 0:
Gi(θi, θj) ≡ V Si − WSj =





− (1 − βi)bi = 0 (9)
Note that Gi = 0, the equilibrium condition in labor market i, depends on θj only















that is negative because all the terms inside the square brackets are negative. Moreover,
note that limθi→0 Gi(θi,θj) = +∞ and limθi→+∞ Gi(θi,θj) = −∞ because of the Inada
conditions imposed both in the ﬁnal good production function and in the vacancy entry
5rate. So, since Gi is continuous and always decreasing in θi, it exists a θi such that
Gi = 0, ∀θj.
















i ∈ {m,n}. Both Ai and Bi are negative; Ai is the part of the derivative in (10)
that stems from the search technology, whereas Bi is the part that stems from the
production technology. Finally, I diﬀerentiate Gi with respect to θj:
dGi
dθj






The term is positive because the intermediate goods are p-substitutes.
2.5 Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
The steady-state equilibrium values of tightness in both sectors are characterized by a
system of two equations:  
Gn(θn,θm) = 0
Gm(θm,θn) = 0 (12)
where every function Gi represents the equilibrium condition in the i-th labor market.
The novelty with respect to the standard matching model hinges on the link between
the two intermediate sectors: each labor market depends on tightness of the other one
through the price (the marginal productivity) of the intermediate good.
Proposition 1 There is a unique steady-state equilibrium in tightness levels
Proof. I divide the proof in three steps:
1. Intercepts of Gn(θn, θm) = 0 and Gm(θm, θn) = 0.
Think of Gn = 0 and Gm = 0 as two functions in (θn,θm) space. Then, consider
limθj→0 Gi(θi,θj) = 0. Since limθj→0 Ej = 0, I conclude that the solution θi
of limθj→0 Gi(θi,θj) = 0 is positive. Hence, the intercept of Gn = 0 along the
horizontal axis is positive and the intercept of Gm = 0 along the vertical axis is
also positive. See Figure 1.
62. Gn = 0 and Gm = 0 deﬁne monotonously increasing relationships in a (θn,θm)
space.












with i ∈ {m,n}. and i  = j.
3. Existence and uniqueness.




























I multiply the numerator of (15) by the denominator of (16) and the numerator
of (16) with the denominator of(15). I get four positive terms in the LHS and
only one positive term in the RHS. For (14) to hold, the four positive terms on
the LHS must be greater than the term on the RHS. One of the term on the LHS
is:










The positive term on the RHS is:










Expressions (17) and (18) are equal because of the Euler’s formula for linear
homogeneous functions3. Then, inequality (14) is veriﬁed. I have two increasing
functions in (θm,θn) space. Moreover, the slope of the function with a positive
intercept with the horizontal axis (Gn = 0) is always larger than the slope of the
function with positive intercept in the vertical axis (Gm = 0). An equilibrium













73 Complementarities and substitutabilities
The model of this paper is not new in the search-matching literature. However, to the
best of my knowledge, this paper is the ﬁrst one devoted to studying the analytical
eﬀects that are at work in such framework. These eﬀects crucially depend on the search
and production technologies presented in Section 1. Therefore, I divide my analysis in
two parts.
3.1 Production technology
The presence of a demand for goods not perfectly elastic makes productive comple-
mentarity between sectors and substitutability within sectors coexist in the economy.
Consider the equilibrium system (12). When ﬁrms open new vacancies in sector i,
labor market tightness θi increases and the productivity pj in the other intermediate
sector, j, increases too. This eﬀect occurs because the two intermediate inputs are
p-substitutes. Since in equilibrium the price of the intermediate good is equal to its
marginal productivity, ﬁrms in sector j will get higher revenues and, to restore the zero
proﬁt condition, new vacancies in this sector will be opened too. So a productivity com-
plementarity arise between the sectors. In terms of tightness, such complementarity
is equivalent to Inequality (13) and it can be seen in Figure 1, where both curves are
upward sloping. However, this is not the only eﬀect present in the economy. When a
new vacancy is opened in sector i, labor market tightness θi and, in turn, the level of
employment Ei increase too. That has a negative impact on the price of the interme-
diate good pi. Lower price of the intermediate good i reduces the expected revenues of
a ﬁlled vacancy in sector i, so less vacancies will be opened in i. In other words, the
increase in the activity of a ﬁrm in sector i induces other ﬁrms to create less vacancies
in sector i. Productive substitutability is present in the economy; the term Bi in (10)
captures such eﬀect in the model.
3.2 Matching technology
The matching technology also aﬀects the decentralized equilibrium outcome. As Cooper
(1999) observed, any search-matching model gives rise to strategic complementarity and
substitutability4. Strategic substitutability is present because a ﬁrm deciding to post a
new vacancy lowers the probability that other vacancies can be ﬁlled and, therefore, it
induces other ﬁrms to decrease their activity (that is, less vacancies are created). Such
strategic substitutability must be distinguished from that we discussed in the previous
4In his book, Cooper analyzes only the Diamond (1982) model of search and unemployment, but
his reasoning can be extended to all models with a matching technology.
8subsection. There, both complementarity and substitutability are generated through a
price mechanism and therefore they cannot be deﬁned as strategic. In the goods mar-
ket, agents take the price as given and adjust their behaviour according to that. On
the contrary, in the labour market, the Walrasian auctioneer is replaced by a matching
function and the wage is deprived by any allocative role (see Hosios, 1990). In this
context, we can adopt the term strategic substitutability because the action of one
agent negatively aﬀects the best response of the other agents not through a price but
through an aggregate matching technology. In this model, productive substitutability
is represented by term Bi, strategic substitutability by Ai.
In a standard matching model, only the strategic substitutability is present: A
marginal increase in the number of vacancies lowers the probability that they can
be ﬁlled. In models with endogenous productivity, on the contrary, every vacancy
created in sector i decreases both the probability that vacancies in i are ﬁlled and the
productivity of the i-th intermediate good: search substitutability and productivity
substitutability arise5.
3.3 Comparative statics and the multiplier
To better understand the policy implications of such complementarities and substi-
tutabilities, I here analyze what happens when a policy parameter changes. Suppose
for instance a reduction in the level of unemployment beneﬁts in sector n, bn. I con-
sider ﬁrst the standard setup where the demand for intermediate goods is perfectly
elastic so that the price does not change. Then, I study this model and compare the
results. A reduction in bn aﬀects equation Gn = 0: lower unemployment beneﬁts re-
duce workers’ outside option in the Nash bargain and the wage wn decreases. Hence,
ﬁrms will be induced to post more vacancies in the n sector and θn will go up. This is
the standard mechanism at work in simple matching models: when goods demand is
perfectly elastic, it does not exist any link between the two intermediate sectors n and
m and both the complementarity and the substitutability generated by the production
function are equal to zero. Only the strategic substitutability that comes from the
matching technology is present. Diﬀerentiating Gn = 0 with respect to θn and bn and
5If in our matching framework the labor force participation rate was endogenous, the symmetry
between search and production technology would be perfect. Another strategic substitutability would
arise, because an agent deciding to enter the labour market would negatively aﬀect the maximizing
behaviour of other agents outside the labour force. Moreover, also strategic complementarity between
the sides of the market would arise: a new vacancy posted would induce agents to enter the labour
market and the other way round.











where the index ¯ p indicates that we are dealing with the case of perfectly elastic demand
where the increase in supply does not aﬀect the price. As expected, such derivative is
negative: a decrease in the level of unemployment beneﬁts in n increases labor market
tightness θn and so En.
Consider now the hypothesis of not completely elastic demand. In this case, dif-
ferentiating system (12) with respect to θn, θm and bn and again applying the implicit














Dividing the denominator and the numerator by ∂Gn
∂θn
∂Gm













The ﬁrst term of the product on the RHS of (21) is negative. It represents the eﬀects
that arise within the intermediate sector n when bn marginally changes. Note that
this ﬁrst term is greater than (19), because −∂Gn/∂bn = −∂G¯ p
n/∂bn = 1 − βn, and at
the denominator ∂Gn/∂θn is lower than G¯ p
n/∂θn
6 . The reason lies on the fact that in
∂Gn/∂θn there is also the component Bi that captures the productive substitutability
eﬀect: an increase in θn not only reduces the probability of vacancies in n to be ﬁlled,
but also lowers the productivity pn. Therefore, the ﬁrst term in (21) is greater (namely,
less negative) than (19) because of the productive substitutability eﬀect within sector
n. This eﬀect tends to reduce the positive impact on θn caused by a decrease in
the unemployment beneﬁts. On the other hand, the second term on the RHS of (21)
captures the eﬀects that intervene between the two sectors when bn marginally changes.









= Ai < 0,
with i ∈ {m,n}.
10the complementarities existing between sector n and sector m. The denominator is also
positive and lower than one7. Therefore, the second term in (21) is greater than one. It
is a multiplier, because it ampliﬁes the eﬀects of a shock on a single sector (in this case
a change in bn) through the induced response of the other sector: lower unemployment
beneﬁts in n increase the number of vacancies Vn and so θn; this enhances productivity
pm and, consequently, Vm and θm. In turn, lower θm will increase θn even more. Of
course, for the existence of a multiplier, it is necessary that complementarities are
present in both sectors: the increase in θm caused by lower unemployment beneﬁts bn
must in turn aﬀect θn in order to have a multiplicative impact in n sector. We can see
graphically the eﬀects of a decrease in bn looking at Figure 1: the curve Gn = 0 shifts
to the right and in the new equilibrium point E’ both θm and θn are higher8.
So the presence of productive substitutability in the ﬁrst term of (21) tends to
mitigate the impact of a shock on tightness and employment, whereas productive com-
plementarity in the second term tends to enhance it. To see which of two eﬀects is












The ﬁrst ratio on the RHS of (20) is equal to (19). The second ratio is positive and less











Productive substitutability outweighs productive complementarity. So the eﬀect of a
reduction in unemployment beneﬁts bn on θn and employment En is lower in a model
with endogenous than in a standard textbook matching model. There is an intuitive
interpretation for that. Complementarities inﬂuence En only indirectly, via an increase
in employment in the other sector, Em. On the contrary, the productive substitutability
eﬀect inﬂuences employment En directly: when unemployment beneﬁts bn are reduced,
less ﬁrms will enter the n-th sector and post vacancies Vn than in a standard matching
model, because in this framework an increase in Vn produces not only a reduction in
the probability q(θn) of ﬁlling a vacancy (strategic substitutability), but also a lower
price pn (productive substitutability). To sum up:
7To see this, note that showing that the denominator in the second term of (21) is greater than
zero is equivalent to proving inequality (14).
8Under the hypothesis of zero complementarities, the equation Gn = 0 would be a vertical line and
Gn = 0 a horizontal line in (θn,θm) space. A decrease in bn would shift Gn = 0 to the right and the
new equilibrium point would present a higher θn but the same value of θm.
11Proposition 2 Removing the assumption of a perfectly elastic demand for goods in
a Pissarides model yields the following results:
1. Productive substitutability: it diminishes in absolute value the eﬀects of a sector-
speciﬁc shock on tightness and employment in that sector.
2. Productive complementarity: it ampliﬁes through a multiplier the eﬀects of a
sector-speciﬁc shock on the level of tightness and employment in the that sector.
At the same time, it aﬀects the level of tightness and employment in the other
sector.
3. Productive substitutability is stronger than complementarity: in the original sec-
tor, employment and labour market tightness change less than in a standard
matching model
Proof. The second part of point 2 can be easily checked by applying implicit function
theorem and Cramer’s rule to compute dθm/dbn. Otherwise, one can conclude about
the negative sign of dθm/d bn without going through the algebraic passages; since policy
in sector n aﬀects employment in m only through pm and pm depends positively on En,
any change in sector n that raises (lowers) En will also raise (lower) pm and so Em. In
ﬁgure 1, when the curve Gn = 0 shifts to the right, both θn and θm increase.
4 Welfare analysis
Since the work of Hosios (1990), it is well known that a standard matching model with
Nash bargaining does not necessarily reach eﬃciency, that is the steady state value
of the social output is not maximized. More precisely, the so-called Hosios condition
states that if the bargaining power of workers, β, equals the absolute value of η(θ),
the elasticity of the probability q of ﬁlling a vacancy with respect to tightness, the
search externalities are internalized by the ex post Nash bargain. When these values
are diﬀerent, the decentralized equilibrium does not ensure an eﬃcient allocation of
the two inputs (unemployment and vacancies) in the matching technology9.
9The source of such ineﬃciency depends on the way in which the wage formation is formalized.
In the decentralized economy, the extent of substitution between unemployment and vacancies is not
governed by the matching technology but by the bargaining solution. Imposing β = η(θ) is there-
fore equivalent to imposing that the substitution between unemployment and vacancies is adjusted
according to the matching function. See e.g. Pissarides (2000).
12In this section, I analyse the welfare properties of the model presented in the previ-
ous sections, where new complementarities and substitutabilities arise. As usual in the
literature, I consider the simplest setup: the economy is in steady state and the dis-
count rate r tends to 0. I interpret bi as the value of leisure enjoyed by job-seekers and
no longer as the level of unemployment beneﬁts. In the Appendix it is shown that for
a social planner without distributional concerns maximizing social output is equivalent
to maximizing the production of the consumption good and the value of leisure for the
unemployed workers net the cost of posting job vacancies in both sectors. I want to
disentangle the eﬀects arising form one sector and those arising in the other; so, since
for linear homogeneous functions Y = ∂F
∂EnEn + ∂F










Li , i ∈ {m,n}.
(23)
Steady-state equalities in labour market ﬂows are the constraints of social planner’s
maximization problem. Knowing that Vi = θi(Li − Ei) with i ∈ {m,n}, I obtain the
following F.O.C.s:
(pm − bm + kmθm)
dEm
dθm













(pn − bn + knθn)
dEn
dθn













The ﬁrst two terms in (24) represent the net marginal gain of increasing θm with pm
ﬁxed. These terms are the usual ones obtained in the social planner optimization prob-
lem. The third term in (24) represents the marginal productivity loss suﬀered by the
m sector when θm increases marginally. The fourth term is the marginal productivity
gain that ﬁrms in the n sector obtain if θm increases. Equation (25) is symmetric. The























13This is true for every constant return to scale production function10. Of course, the
same holds for the last two terms in (25). The economic intuition of this result is the
following. As we have seen in Section 3, when a ﬁrm decides to open a new vacancy in
the intermediate sector i , productive complementarity and productive substitutability
arise at the same time. For CRS production functions these two eﬀects are equal in










Proposition 3 Consider the system (12) with r → 0. Under Hosios conditions,
βi = η(θi) for i ∈ {m,n}, the decentralized equilibrium is eﬃcient.
Proof. Using (26) and after some algebra, the F.O.C. (24) becomes:
φmα
′(θm)[pm − bm + kmθm] − kmφm[α(θm) + φm] = 0.
Rearranging the terms and knowing that α′(θm) = q(θm)[1 − η(θm)], I get:
q(θm)[1 − η(θm)](pm − bm) = km[α(θm)η(θm) + φm].
With βm = η(θm) (and r → 0), this equation is equivalent to (9). Obviously, the same
passages lead to the same conclusion in sector n.
The Hosios condition applied both in sector n and in sector m are suﬃcient to
ensure the eﬃciency of a two sectors matching model. This makes sense, since in
this model the only departure from the Walrasian framework is the presence of search
externalities in the labour market. However, the hypothesis about a social planner
that does not care about distributional issues must be taken into account. In fact, the
productivity eﬀects that are present in this model do not inﬂuence the eﬃcient value of
labor market tightness that a social planner would choose: if pn and pm were exogenous
(i.e. if the only link between the two intermediate sector disappeared), then a social
planner without distributive concern would select exactly the same values of θm and
θn. What the introduction of productivity externalities changes is the distribution of
the resources between the sectors. Put in other terms, the four productivity eﬀects
present in (24) and (25) can be viewed as a mechanism that shifts resources from one
sector to the other. The net marginal amount of resources that accrues to sector m by

































As I showed above, the sum of (27) and (28) is equal to zero; so expressions in (27) and
(28) either have the same absolute value with opposite sign or are both equal to zero.
If it is true the latter, we have no transfer of resources between sectors. Otherwise,
with (27) positive (negative), resources go from sector n to sector m (from sector m to
sector n). If we imagine a social planner that prefers one sector to the other it is no
longer true he would select the same values of θm and θn that he would have chosen in
the case of perfectly elastic demand.
5 Conclusions
In this paper I tried to explore the consequences of introducing a more realistic set-
up for goods market in a standard matching framework. Models where two or more
labour markets with frictions are linked together through a two-tier productive scheme
are widespread in the macroeconomic and labour literature. However, to the best of
my knowledge, nobody has studied their analytical properties. I have shown that in
this kind of set-up, complementarities arise between sectors and substitutabilities arise
within sectors. The formers emerge because an increase in the number of vacancies
posted in one sector raises also the number of vacancies posted in the other one (given
the assumption of p-substitutes inputs), and this in turn enhances employment. Sub-
stitutabilities emerge because a new vacancy posted in one sector decreases both the
price in that sector and the probability for another vacancy to be ﬁlled. The eﬀects
on employment are the following: in the sector where the shock occurred, employ-
ment changes less than in the standard matching framework. In the other(s) sector(s),
employment also varies, and in the same direction than in the “original” sector.
I have also looked at the welfare properties of the model. Under constant returns
to scale both in the matching and in the production technology the so-called Hosios
condition is suﬃcient to guarantee the eﬃciency of the laissez faire equilibrium.
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Appendix: Derivation of the steady-state value of
the social output










i∈{n,m} and taking all
parameters as ﬁxed, I assume that:
W(t) = P(t) +
 











−r(T−t) [Ei(T)(pi(T) − wi(T)) − kiVi(T)]dT
rVE,i(t) = wi(t) + φi(VU,i(t) − VE,i(t)) + ˙ VE,i(t),
rVU,i(t) = bi + α(θi(t))(VE,i(t) − VU,i(t)) + ˙ VU,i(t).
16in which Vi denotes the number of vacancies in sector i. From the last expressions,
W(t) = rW(t) − ˙ W(t)
= rP(t) − ˙ P(t) +
 










Ei(t)(rΠi(t) − ˙ Πi(t))
W(t) = rW(t) − ˙ W(t)
= F(En(t),Em(t)) − pn(t)En(t) − pm(t)Em(t)
+
 
[Ei(t)(wi(t) + φi(VU,i(t) − VE,i(t)))]
+
 








Ei(t)(pi(t) − wi(t)) − kiVi(t).
Simplifying,















If the labour force is exogenous, Li = Ei + Ui. Hence, ˙ Ei(t) = − ˙ Ui(t). Plugging this
in the last expression, a term cancels out, namely:
(α(θi(t))Ei(t) − φiEi(t) + ˙ Ui(t))(VE,i(t) − VU,i(t)) = 0
Finally,












with W(t) as deﬁned above. After a dynamic adjustment, W(t) will reach a steady
state. If r → 0 and since I integrate over [t,±∞), I can neglect the adjustment path
and consider that a planner should maximize W(t) where t denotes the steady state.
18Figure 1: Existence and uniqueness of the steady-state equilibrium
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